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Average Cost
The total cost of production divided by the total output.
Externality
This arises when an action by one household or firm directly
imposes costs (negative externality) or benefits (positive
externality) on other households or firms, and these direct
effects are not fully reflected in market prices.
Marginal Cost
The additional cost incurred in order to produce one additional
unit of output.
Merit Good
A good that the people as a whole think that all people should
consume, no matter what their incomes.
Natural Monopoly
An industry in which any relevant level of output is more cheaply
produced by one firm than by two or more.  Natural monopolies are
caused by scale economies.
Public Good
A good with two attributes: 1) even if it is consumed by one
person, it is still available for consumption by others; and 2)
it is difficult or impossible to prevent people from freely
consuming the good.  Because of this latter attribute,
individuals have no incentive to reveal the value of the good to
them by purchasing it or offering to pay a share of its cost.
Scale Economies
These occur when a firm's long-run average cost falls as its
output increases over the relevant range of production.  Marginal
cost is below average cost.
Two-Part Tariff
A pricing technique in which users pay a fixed sum for access to
a service and pay another charge for each unit of the service
they consume.  The charge per unit may vary, making the system a
multi-part tariff.  When the charge per unit increases with the
amount consumed and starts at a very low rate, it is called
"life-line" pricing.PROVIDING URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Introduction
The rapidly growing cities of the developing world generate
immense social, economic, and political problems for their
governments [note 1].  At best, such growth reflects the success
of agricultural policy, where increased farm productivity has
made agricultural labor available for industrial and other urban
activities.  At worst, city growth reflects the failure of a
pro-urban, anti-rural policy bias that drives workers from the
land before the growth in agricultural productivity makes them
redundant there.
In either case, the growing numbers of poor, industrially
unskilled workers and their families in the cities of the less
developed countries (LDCs) place costly stresses on the urban
environment and demand costly expansions of the urban residential
infrastructure.
Why Provide Amenities?
This new LDC proletariat is poor in many ways.  They work at
low-capital, low-skill, low-wage jobs, often in the
life-sustaining but seemingly unproductive "informal" sector.
They are poor -- poor in their consumption of food and clothing
and poor in the urban environment they endure.  Of all the things
the urban poor lack, why should LDC municipalities provide
drinking water, sanitation facilities, and solid waste
collection?
The answer is threefold.  One, these urban amenities are provided
by a competitive private sector only at much greater cost than
experienced by an efficient single producer (scale economies*).
Two, the availability and consumption of these services generate
benefits beyond those enjoyed by the consumer (externalities*).
And three, there are aspects of these amenities that make it
difficult or inappropriate to deny the services to those who
cannot or will not pay (an element of public goods*).  In most
societies, these urban amenities are also widely recognized as
merit goods.*  (Economic terms, followed by an asterisk when they
are first used, are defined in the Glossary.)
In short, "urban poverty is not simply a matter of individual
income; it is part of the spatial and physical organization of
the cities" (Roberts 1978: 37) (see box 1).----------------------------------------------------------------
Box 1.  Why Provide Amenities?
* An efficient single producer is much less costly than
competitive private sectors.
* Availability of products generates benefits beyond those
enjoyed by consumers.
* It is inappropriate to deny these services to those who cannot
pay.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lessons from the Now-Industrialized Countries
The provision of urban amenities in rapidly growing cities is
hardly a new problem on this planet.  The now-industrialized
countries experienced it a century ago.  Unfortunately for LDC
policy formation, we do not learn much from earlier experience,
for three reasons:
1. Population growth rates are much higher in LDCs than they were
in the now-industrialized world a century ago.  Thus, comparable
rates of urbanization in LDCs have meant much larger rates of
growth in the size of LDC cities.  Providing urban amenities
today is a much larger problem.
2. Today's industrializations are occurring at lower per capita
income levels than historically experienced by the now-
industrialized nations.  Today's LDCs, on a per capita basis, do
not have as many resources available for providing urban
amenities as did earlier industrializing countries.
3. Nineteenth-century industrialization and urbanization were
undertaken "on the cheap" (Williamson 1990: 270).  Urban
amenities were provided belatedly and inadequately, especially
in the working-class sections of towns.  The public tolerance of
lower life expectancy in the cities than in the countryside led
Friedrich Engels to label the British rural-urban migration
"social murder."  Such under-provision of amenities is,
to twentieth-century thinking, neither morally nor politically
defensible.
The goal of universal provision of basic urban amenities has long
been accepted.  The Twelfth World Health Assembly initiated the
Community Water Supply Program with this objective as early as
1959.  However, some quarter billion urban residents in LDCs are
still without water of reasonable quality or access to sanitation
facilities (World Bank 1992: 47).  Specifically, 18% of the urban
residents of developing countries are without safe drinking
water, 28% without sanitation facilities, 30-50% without solid
waste collection.  At the current pace of progress, we cannot
expect universal access to basic water and sewage in cities for
another half century.Causes of Inadequate Coverage
Inadequate coverage for basic municipal services in LDCs is
usually attributed to the low GNP per capita, the rapid rate of
population growth, and/or the rapid rate of urbanization in these
countries.  Scatter diagrams support such hypotheses; Figure 1
relates the percentage of the urban population with water and
sanitation coverage to each country's GNP per capita [note 2].
Visually, there is a loose positive relationship between the two.
But the dispersion in coverage rates is also very large for any
given level of GNP per capita [note 3].
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 1.  LDC Urban Coverage Rates and GNP per Capita
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-----------------------------------------------------------------
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, evidence from multiple
regression analysis [note 4] suggests that the greater the extent
or rate of an LDC's urbanization, the better will be the urban
coverage of water and sanitation facilities.  GNP and population,
and their growth rates, add nothing significant to the
explanation of such coverage [note 5].
The actual extent of water and sanitation coverage in an LDC is
not simply a matter of the country's ability to extend coverage.
As the UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program put it:
"Failure to achieve coverage targets in the 1980s has as much to
do with the manner in which funding sources have been mobilized,
allocated, and used as with the absolute level of resources
available (1990: 13)."
Regression analysis supports this political interpretation: where
the numbers of urban people are large, governments are responsive
to urban needs.The High Cost of Providing First-Class Coverage
The basic urban amenities -- water, sewage, and refuse disposal--
are not cheap.  "First-class" service in each of these can amount
to a sizeable portion of the incomes of many of the poorer
residents of LDC cities.  Compare these typical costs with per
capita GNPs that average $320 in low-income economies and $2,220
in middle-income economies (World Bank 1992):
Water
In a city of a half million people, the capital costs of an
entirely new, modern water supply system run about $48 per
person.  Individual household connections cost another $100 each.
These costs occur before a drop of water has been provided to
the household.
Sewage
The capital costs of a complete, modern sewage system, with
capacity for sewage treatment, run $300-$1000 per connected
household.  Even connecting a household flush toilet to an
existing sewer system costs about $200. Again, these costs occur
before a single toilet is flushed.
Solid Waste
Unlike water and sewage, there are few scale economies in solid
waste.  Solid waste collection and disposal in LDC cities often
accounts for more than one fourth of the total municipal budget
expenditure.  Despite the lower wages of LDCs and the primitive
landfill processes found in most, refuse collection costs rival
those of the now-industrialized countries -- $14-$113 per metric
ton (see box 2).
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Box 2. Cost of "First Class" Service
Water              $100 per  household
Sewage             $300-$1000 per  household
Waste Disposal     $14-$113  per metric ton
                             GNP per capita
Low income economies         $320
Middle income economies      $2220
-----------------------------------------------------------------In short, "first-class" provision of the three basic urban
amenities to all citizens is beyond the budgetary reach of most
LDCs.
Prices and Revenues
Not only are the costs of urban amenities high, but it is often
hard to recapture the benefits in the revenues.  In addition,
because benefits to the community are greater than benefits to
individuals alone, communities should be willing to provide more
services than a market solution would provide.  Many LDCs
compound these inevitable budget problems by applying
inappropriate pricing policies that generate unnecessary losses.
With losses come declining service levels, the need for
subsidies, and the absence of financial reserves to provide for
expansion as cities grow.
Let us now explore the price and revenue problems -- both the
inevitable and the "man-made" problems -- that endanger the
adequate provision of urban amenities.  The economic theory of
the pricing in basic competitive or monopolistic industrial
structures is well developed and understood.  But production of
urban amenities rarely fits these simple models, and the
teachings of economic theory become muddied:
1. When there are positive externalities, as with the provision
of sewage facilities and refuse collection and the concomitant
reduction of neighborhood disease, we know that private
competitive markets will produce too little at too high a price.
But it is not easy, in practice, to estimate the extent of the
divergence from the optimum.
2. With public goods, such as street lights and air quality, the
difficulty of excluding those who will not pay makes it less
likely that the private market can provide these goods
profitably.  The absence of market information makes it difficult
to estimate how much these goods are worth to people and hence
how much it is socially desirable to provide.  (For a survey of
the techniques economists have developed for making these
estimates, see Hoehn and Walker 1993.)
3. In natural monopolies,* such as water and sewage systems,
there is an inevitable pricing ambivalence.  We would like to
provide the product to any family that is willing to pay the
marginal cost* of the provision of that product to the family;
but the marginal cost is below the average cost.*  Hence, setting
prices at marginal cost implies that there will be losses (i.e.
price will be below average cost).
"Man-made" problems are added to these theoretical complexities.
Many LDC municipalities set amenity prices too low, below both
marginal and average cost.  This is not done consciously but
rather emerges over time when the general price level gradually
or rapidly rises and it is politically difficult to raise amenity
prices proportionally.  Sometimes the prices are set sensibly,
but the bills are not collected regularly.Sometimes there are "leakages": when water piped into the system
is unaccounted for in the billing.  For example, 58% of the water
is unaccounted for in Manila (Philippines).  Overall, the World
Bank estimates that "on average, households in developing
countries pay only 35% of the cost of supplying water" (1992:
16).
Sometimes municipal facilities are turned into employment-
providers -- some LDCs employ three to four times as many workers
as needed in similar LDCs.  Losses on these accounts can become
huge.
Revenue shortfalls mean deterioration in the quality of service
and delays in the expansion of services into new residential
areas.  It is usually the poorest urban residents who end up
deprived.  They live in the newest residential areas (i.e. the
squatter settlements), and lack the political clout to insist on
services and maintenance.  When the poor are targeted for
adequate levels of urban amenities, the general shortage of these
services in LDC cities means that middle-income families quickly
buy into these adequately serviced areas.  The lucky poor who
were selected to participate are left with a capital gain but
still without services.
Public subsidy or financing of some urban services does not
require public delivery of those services.  In many cases, the
well-known efficiency of the private sector, with some regulatory
constraints, can be used to deliver publicly funded amenities.
The Willingness of the Poor to Pay for Amenities
To some extent, the desperate poverty of the urban poorest makes
it difficult for them to display much willingness to pay for
basic water, sewage, and waste collection services.  But there is
increasing evidence that the urban poor are, in fact, willing to
pay surprisingly large sums for these basic amenities.  Let's
consider two examples.
1. In Onitsha (Nigeria), only 10% of the households are connected
to city water.  They pay on average $3 per kiloliter.  The rest
of the city relies on private water provision.  The very poor
carry buckets to retail water vendors and pay the equivalent of
$50 per kiloliter for their very small quantities of water [note
6].  The poor thus display a marginal willingness to pay for
water that is 15 to 20 times the marginal willingness to pay of
the rich.
2. In Ukundu (Kenya), households not connected to the city water
system can get "free" water at distant open wells or buy water at
nearby kiosks for $0.50 per kiloliter.  Most (62%) of the
families choose the kiosks.  Each family's time-versus-money
decision, implicit in its choice of well water or kiosk water,
was analyzed.  The cost of kiosk water, including the money value
of the carrying time, was about $3.20 per kiloliter.  It is, of
course, the $3.20, not the $0.50, that indicates the willingness
to pay for in-house connection or delivery.There is less evidence of willingness to pay by the poor for
sewage and waste collection.  However, this does not necessarily
mean it is a lower priority.  Rather, the externality and
public-good aspects of these amenities make their private
provision rare [note 7].  Hence, it is virtually impossible to
utilize market data to estimate willingness to pay for what could
be a relatively cheap public amenity.  When drinking water is not
provided, it is found and bought somewhere.  But when sewage
disposal and waste collection are not provided, the growing and
decaying presence of sewage, garbage, and litter is endured.
So far, we have examined the situation and the problems in the
provision of urban amenities.  The next two sections will
describe two fundamental policy prescriptions for the appropriate
provision of amenities in developing countries.
Appropriate Technology for Providing Urban Amenities
Because "first-class" service is usually prohibitively expensive,
consideration of low-cost technologies is imperative if the poor
of the LDC cities are to receive drinking water, sewage
facilities, and solid waste removal in reasonable quality at
affordable prices.  Fortunately, in the past decade, a wide array
of low-cost technologies for providing these basic urban
amenities has been successfully developed and tested:
Water
Connecting each house to municipal piped water can more than
double the capital cost of providing water in most LDC cities.
Communal standpipes are the major way of reaching the poor at low
cost.  Mobile delivery (tanker or bicycle) or kiosk sales are
sometimes utilized.  And in some cases, where groundwater
conditions permit, hand pumps can be used to replace contaminated
open wells in smaller cities.
Sewage
Many low-cost innovative approaches exist for sewage.  Small-bore
sewers can be used in combination with septic tanks.  Sewage
systems, called "condominial," can utilize a shorter grid of
smaller, shallower sewers as feeders into the main system (Figure
2).
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 2. Conventional and Condominial Sewage Systems
(This figure can not be shown in the gopher format.)
Source:  World Bank 1992: 107.
-----------------------------------------------------------------Cost savings are largest if decentralized on-site sanitation can
be used -- most appropriately in low-density urban areas with
well-drained soil and low water consumption rates.  The
pour-flush toilets developed in India and the ventilated pit
latrine developed in Zimbabwe are widely used in LDCs.
Solid Waste
Capital is expensive relative to labor in LDCs.  Thus, low-cost
provision of municipal refuse removal services usually involves
labor-intensive technologies.  Rather than garbage pick-up at
each house, communal dumpsters can cut costs, and, because the
carrying distance is short, the litter problem is not made worse.
Some communities use push carts.
Financial incentives can also motivate people to carry their
wastes even greater distances.  In Curitiba (Brazil), a city too
densely populated for access by collection trucks, trash is
collected at stations where bags of garbage are exchanged for
food.
Privatization of solid waste services can also cut costs
dramatically in many LDCs.  And encouragement, rather than
discouragement, of scavengers can not only reduce the volume of
trash going to landfills, but also provide jobs and incomes for
the very poor.  Finally, state-of-the-art sanitary landfills
should be postponed just getting the trash to any "dump" is an
immense improvement over leaving it in densely populated
residential areas.
The basic lesson is that there are low-cost, labor-intensive
technologies becoming available for water, sewage, and waste.
Great improvements over no service can be attained at a fraction
of the cost of "first-class" service.
Multiple Pricing of Urban Amenities
Slavish adherence to a doctrine of one-product-one-price will
slow the spread of municipal services into poor areas.  Though
convinced of their need for better water, sanitation, and waste
services, the poor cannot always pay even the marginal cost of
providing them with state-of-the-art services.
The answer is often different products for different income
groups -- or, what comes to the same thing after self-selective
migration, for different residential areas.  But where a single
service to all is deemed appropriate, the answer may lie in
different prices to different people for the same product.  Where
very little water is demanded, free water for limited hours may
be a better way to serve the poor than the costly installation
and monitoring of meters.
Increasingly embraced for externality-generating urban amenities
is "life-line" pricing, which takes the form of progressive
prices, where the first few units of the service cost very
little, but later units cost increasingly more per unit.  Suchtwo-part tariffs* have the dual advantage of subsidizing the poor
and of permitting sufficiently high rates for the rich so that
losses are avoided (Prakash 1987).
Finally, it is often the large, once-and-for-all, initial
connection fee -- rather than the ongoing water or sewage fees --
that deters the poor from connecting into a municipal system for
providing urban amenities.  For these people, for whom the
connection fees are too great for their own savings but too small
to be of interest to the capital markets at reasonable interest
rates, connection "mortgages" at commercial interest rates may be
appropriate (Linn 1983) (see box 3).
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Box 3.  Cost of Alternative Sanitation Techniques
Technology                         Mean Annual Cost (1978$)
Low Cost
Pour-flush toilet                              19
Pit latrine                                    28
Communal toilet                                34
Vacuum-truck cartage*                          38
Low-cost septic tank*                          52
Composting toilet                              55
Bucket cartage                                 65
Medium Cost
Sewered aqua privy*                           159
Aqua privy                                    168
Japanese vacuum-truck cart                    188
High Cost
Septic Tank*                                  369
Sewage*                                       400
Costs include appropriate shadow prices for unskilled labor,
foreign exchange, and capital.
* Suitable for urban areas.
Source:  Linn 1983: 151.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
There are compelling arguments for providing basic urban
amenities for all residents of LDC cities, perhaps even on a
subsidized basis for the very poor.  Does this mean further
increasing the "urban bias" (Lipton 1976) of development
strategy?  It need not.  The urban poor need public provision of
water, sewage, and waste disposal services more than the rural
poor; the total cost of minimal provision of these amenities is
higher in urban areas than in rural areas; and the externalbenefits of their provision are greater in urban areas than in
rural areas.  These three facts make such provision higher in
priority in urban than in rural areas.
An urban-rural balance in the provision of public services does
not mean an identical public expenditure on identical public
services in the two areas.  To offset the greater expenditure on
water, sewage, and waste disposal appropriate for the urban poor,
LDCs should stand ready to incur the greater expenses required to
provide other services to the rural poor, such as education,
health care, and transport.  The argument here is not that the
urban poor should be benefited at the expense of the rural poor,
but rather that the urban poor should be benefited by receiving a
more appropriate mix of public and private goods.
NOTES
1.  This Policy Brief has been largely excerpted from
EPAT Working Paper No. 9 (Coolidge et al. 1993); sources,
more examples, and fuller explanations are given there.
2.  Figure 1 utilizes 1980 data for 57 LDCs.  GNP per
capita is in US$ and displayed on log scale.  Source: WHO 1984
and UNDP 1991.
3.  Simple regressions of various measures of LDC urban
environmental welfare on per capita GNP across LDCs and time
generally uncover both the small positive relation and the high
variability around a best-fit line.
4.  Multiple regression analysis is suggestive.  When the
urban percent coverage rates (for water and sanitation, in turn)
of these 57 LDCs are regressed on four independent variables
(1980 GNP per capita, 1980s growth rate of GNP per capita, 1980s
growth rate of population, and 1980 percentage of population
urbanized), only the last estimated coefficient is significant.
And, surprisingly, it is significantly positive in both
regressions.
5.  Of course, one must recognize the possibility of a
reverse causation--the better the urban coverage of water and
sanitation facilities, the greater the induced rate of
rural-urban migration.
6.  Prices in dollars are given only to indicate the
relative magnitudes of the prices to the rich and the poor; their
absolute values are biased by the over-valued exchange rate used
for the conversion.
7.  There is extensive developing country recycling of
refuse, largely in the informal sector, but little solid waste
collection and disposal.REFERENCES
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